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9 December 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interim Analysis of Intelligence Production, Months of
June and October 1948

FROM: S/P&P (Task Force 15%)

1. Statistical analysis of informational data relating to "Operation 15%" has been made by the Task Force having cognizance. Subject analysis is attached hereto.

2. Certain factors germane to the 15% problem have taken on sufficient weight in the course of the analytical study to suggest that the personnel increases which caused this Operation to be undertaken may prove self-justifying and self-defensible from an overall point of view. This is not intended to conceal certain negative factors which require further study, and which may prove indicative of a need for correction.

3. The accuracy of the figures presented herewith necessarily varies because of the lack of a common unit of measurement applicable to the several categories of effort. In all cases, however, the same unit of measurement has been applied wherever comparative figures are given so that, although Daily Estimate Items for example, may not be measured against Intelligence Memos, the figures for each category accurately reflect the independent comparative picture for the two test months.

4. From a positive point of view, the following observations are made:

a. Sometime during the month of July it became an ORE operational policy to reduce the number of items carried in CIA Current Intelligence by a more strict prohibition of articles deemed not extremely significant. Thus, there has been no great increase in the production of these articles by ORE Regional Branches in most cases.

b. The impact of international developments determines the amount of current intelligence production necessary, and, naturally, into which Regional Branches the production responsibility will fall, thus creating an uncontrollable variable.

c. The lack of adequate information with which to produce quasi-basic intelligence, such as SR's, controls the production thereof. It can be assumed that where the information is available, the SR has been written, excepting of course, where the SR priority is not considered high enough to warrant its production against more important items.

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d. The increased demands for special estimates and background information by high-level policy bodies in certain areas has diverted effort from the official type study.

e. Some Branches have recently assumed added responsibilities as information suppliers to new Governmental organizations such as the ECA, Voice of America, etc., requiring considerable time in meetings, conferences, and preparation of materials.

f. A few branches have had no significant personnel increases and one has sustained a decrease.

5. Further study is being made of the following negative factors which have come to light:

a. Production decreases shown by the Latin America Branch are difficult to explain in view of the increase of 15 percent in professional personnel and 11 percent in clerical.

b. The over-all production increase has been in working-level intelligence, with a decrease in official intelligence production, which may or may not be what is desired.

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INTERIM ANALYSIS

Explanatory Notes

Definitions:

Staff Intelligence includes:

Situation Reports: Item contributions or in whole as indicated.
No attempt was made to give "whole products"
more value than items.

ORE's (Estimates): Same as above

Intelligence Memoranda: Always indicated as a "whole product"

CIA's (monthlys): Branches in most cases took credit for
"Whole CIA's" when reference should have
been to item contributions--however, it is
standard throughout.

Working Level Intelligence:

Dailys - Weeklys, etc: Shown as "item contributions", except by
B/LA; correction being worked out with that
branch.

Articles: Annexes to Current Intelligence

Maps: Information necessary for base maps to show
current situation (shown only by NE/A; ad-
justment will be made either to include this
for all components or to eliminate it in
the case of NE/A.)

Contributory Efforts Include:

Requirements: (measured in items)
Briefings: (number)
Evaluation of Reports: (number of reports)
Evaluation of Sources: (coverage analysis - not ORE-wide practice)

Although specific category breakdowns are
not given here, each Branch was analyzed
individually on these factors as in production.

Mechanics of Analysis

Production figures shown for June vs. October in all production items,--
from this CIA official intelligence production percentage increase or decrease
was derived from totals of current and staff figures together with working
level intelligence production.

Personnel percentages arrived at by simple percentage differences of
June vs. October in clerical and professional ranks, based on S/AD figures,
which are under review following discovery of major discrepancy.